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President Bryan, Ladies and Gentlemen: 
Because American constitutional history has been CflSlS 
history the absence in the political and legal literature of any 
theory of constitutional crisis appears as striking as would 
the absence of a condemned man at his execution. One 
might speculate about what economics would be like with-
out a crisis theory, or psychology without a body of ma-
terial seeking to explain the growth and resolution of psychic 
tensions. To build such a theory in constitutional study is a 
perilous task: and where the Warrens, Corwins, Powells, and 
Boudins have feared to tread I do not propose to rush in. 
Yet I should like to set down in a tentative fashion some 
notes on the relation of constitutional crisis to the democratic 
state of today. 
There have been three major types of constitutional crisis 
in our history. You get one type when there is a sharp dis-
crepancy between the needs of effective government on the 
one hand and on the other the limits of tolerance imposed 
by the Supreme Court on the policy (generally economic 
policy) of the government. You can, if you wish, put it 
into somewhat Freudian terms: the id, or driving part of the 
governmental psyche, wants desperately to follow certain 
lines of action; the superego, or the censor in the shape of the 
Supreme Court, says No. If the cleavage between the two 
is acute enough, you get breakdown. 
The second type of crisis, generally linked to the first, 
comes when there is a frontal attack (or counter-attack) on 
the judicial power, whether on the part of Congress or the 
President, generally (although not necessarily) in order to 
make it more responsive to the popular consciousness of the 
time. In this sort of crisis the desire for a realignment of 
Supreme Court policy clashes with the sense of the need for 
retaining judicial independence of political change, and with 
the related sense of the Constitution as a basic protection 
of our liberties and of the Supreme Court as having a guar-
dian-role toward the Constitution. 
The third type comes when the Constitution, in emergen-
cies, is actually stretched beyond its usual bounds, and where 
the unwonted stretching, necessary though it may be, raises 
questions of the breakdown of the whole constitutional fabric. 
This generally occurs in periods of military emergency, as 
during the Civil War, the World War, and the present one, 
and relates generally to the expansion of Presidential power. 
In oversimplified terms, the first may be called an economic 
constitutional crisis, because its origin and occasion are eco-
nomic change and economic policy. The second may be 
called a judicial constitutional crisis, because its origin and 
occasion are the expansion of judicial power and the threat 
to it. The third may be called a war constitutional crisis, 
because its origin and occasion are the demands that a war 
makes upon executive leadership, with all the dangers that 
it involves for civil liberties and political responsibility. All 
three are facets of the democratic crisis state. 
I don't know whether it is subversive to use the term 
"crisis state" to apply to our democracy. I included it one 
summer in a catalogue description of a course I was to give 
at a university, and I received a polite little note saying that 
one of the university authorities questioned the wisdom of 
using that phrase. Wisdom or no wisdom, the reality of our 
crisis is a fact. It is not something that can be exorcised by 
verbal magic. We have on our hands a crisis democracy-
one that must navigate through the ~hoals and scudding 
drifts dangerous to a democratic bark, one which seeks to use 
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every aid on its voyage but must cling to the difficult course 
of state power without state monopoly of thought or action, 
one which must contrive ever new strategies of economic 
control and create ever new administrative mechanisms, one 
which must somehow survive as a constitutional system while 
fighting its enemies without and within, one which must be-
come a planned economy without destroying democratic re-
sponsibility and a military state without suppressing civil 
liberties. You can, if you will, refuse to use the term "crisis 
state." But our ancestors found they could not wipe out the 
fact of sex by calling a leg a limb. 
We must start with the need for effective government. 
The greatness of the Federalist lies not so much, as has been 
thought, in the exposition of valid principles of political phil-
osophy. It lies rather in the theme of a government effective 
enough to meet the problems it confronts. Many of the po-
litical attitudes of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay have been 
whittled down by time, and have been converted to the uses 
of minority rights rather than majority rule. But the Fed-
eralist remains one of the world's great books because, as in 
all great literature, its core theme is ever new. And that 
core theme is the need for adequate government. 
Today a new Federalist could be written, recounting the 
changes and chances of our national life, and the new require-
ments of effective government. It has been remarked that 
the Supreme Court is an adjourned session of the Constitu-
tional Convention. There is a sense in which this carries an 
ironic freightage. But the irony is not, as we have tended to 
suppose, merely in the reference to judicial law-making. 
There have been ample instances of a proper place for in-
terpretative creativeness by the Court. "We must never 
forget," John Marshall said, "that it is a Constitution we are 
expounding." The irony lies in the fact that the Court has 
more often used its great power for sterilizing than for fer-
tilizing the materials of American growth. And the irony lies 
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also in the fact that the Court has claimed for itself alone the 
creative potential. The fact is that in every crisis we must 
govern with the freshness of eye and the largeness of spirit 
of a Constitutional Convention. There are times when we 
must act like the Founding Fathers or commit national sui-
cide. 
If we really want to live, we'd better start at once to try; 
If we don't, it doesn't matter, but we'd better start to die. l 
Pan of the problem of democratic survival is constitu-
tional, much of it is political and economic. We cannot con-
tinue to draw the sharp boundaries between the two realms 
that we have drawn in the past. The fact is that in a con-
stitutional democracy, whatever the reality of the forces in-
volved in the struggle over direction, the rhetoric that the 
minority groups will use in opposing changes is always the 
rhetoric of constitutionalism. There is an interesting com-
parison to be drawn here between the situation a half-cen-
tury ago, in the days of the triumph of Mr. Justice Field, 
and the situation today. The conservative Court majority at 
that time formed an idea of a rigid economic system that was 
best off left alone and that could not be violated; it alone 
was identified with constitutionalism. The enemy they were 
fighting was "socialism," and anything was socialism that 
did not fit into their accustomed economic scheme. The 
constitutional crisis of 1935-1938 was the final term in the 
proportional sequence of their reasoning. Today a similar 
group in the country has fetishized a rigid political system. 
To our amateur constitutional lawyers in Congress and out, 
that alone is constitutional. The enemy they are fighting is 
"dictatorship," and anything is dictatorship that does not 
come within their accustomed view of administrative func-
tion, presidential power, and the shaping of foreign policy. 
Fifty years ago this group stood for inaction in the sphere 
1 w. H. Auden, Poems, p. 42, New York, Random House, 1934. 
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of the government of industry. Today it adds inaction in 
the fashioning of foreign policy. 
The issue is still the adaptability of our constitutional 
framework, its adequacy to meet the demands laid upon it. 
There are, however, differences between the two situations. 
Except in an indirect sense, the struggle today is not one 
over economic organization, although it is likely to become 
so when the question of the organization of a war economy 
reaches-as it may reach soon-a constitutional phase. Thus 
far the struggle is mainly over the limits of political action 
and the lines of the distribution of power. Another differ-
ence is that the force obstructing effective government is no 
longer the Supreme Court, which with its present personnel 
and in its current doctrinal phase is reasonably ready to 
give the green light to expansive programs for domestic and 
foreign policy. The obstructive force has come to be located 
mainly in Congress, and in areas of the press and particular 
interest groups. 
But if the accidental factors have changed, the essential 
problem of effective government remains. And the aspects 
of constitutional crisis in which this problem has at various 
times been clothed are worth reviewing. 
Some day the full and rounded story of the New Deal 
constitutional crisis may be written. To say that, may of 
course, be only a pious hope. For the full and rounded 
story even of the Jefferson-Marshall constitutional crisis has 
not been written, despite the zeal of many of our histOrians. 
We have had accounts of Jefferson's attack on the Court, 
and accounts of the Court's attack on Jefferson and states' 
rights. But we have had no detailed account of each attack 
in relation to the other, of both in relation to the economic 
factors of a developing industrialism, the political factors of 
a new federal structure, and the psychological factors of the 
clash between old and new symbols; and finally of all these 
factors in the context of an international climate of opinion 
that had been created by the world's revolutions of the 
eighteenth century. 
So too with the New Deal constitutional crisis. We have 
had in Alsop and Catledge's The 168 Days, an account of the 
legislative battle in a popular vein written from the bias of 
critics of President Roosevelt's Court proposal. And former 
Attorney General (now Mr. Justice) Jackson has given us, in 
his Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, a survey of the Court's 
behavior before and after the legislative fight. Justice Jack-
son's book reads a little like the testimonial of a man who 
is sure that the medicine made all the difference in the world 
between the feeling before and the feeling after, but is a 
little ashamed-being a doctor himself-of being beholden to 
what may have been, after all, a somewhat slickly concocted 
patent remedy. But we have not yet had, and it may be a 
long time before we get, a history of the crisis which sees 
it steadily and sees it whole-which relates it to economic 
changes, to the class-structure of our society, to the struggle 
for political power, to the world crisis, to the psychological 
roots of fear and insecurity. 
What I set down here is no history: merely a sequence 
of reflections on the course and the meaning of a particular 
constitutional crisis. Before we can understand the New 
Deal crisis, we must understand that it followed on two de-
velopments. One was a revolutionary situation in the world 
at large, which produced and was produced by economic 
dislocation, and which put an enormous strain on our eco-
nomic and political invention and our national will. The 
second was a felt need for decisive action in the economic 
realm, for a sort of legislative Blitzkreig, and the develop-
ment of administrative strategies so considerable that the past 
decade may well go down in American history as most sig-
nificantly that of our administrative revolution. 
It was some dim knowledge of the revolutionary situation 
in the world at large, and of its bearing on American his-
tory, which impelled the Administration to make its rela-
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tively vigorous attempt to seek a solution of the problem of 
production and employment by new economic strategies and 
administrative controls. It was the unwillingness of the Su-
preme Court majority to recognize the nature of world eco-
nomics that led to their following the one tradition of seeing 
the Constitution as an inflexible verbal testament, rather than 
the other tradition of seeing it as a tool for effective govern-
ment.2 Out of this clash between the action of the Admin-
istration and the opposition of the Court, an irresistible force 
and an immovable object, came the constitutional crisis. 
Or perhaps I should put it somewhat differently. We start 
with economic breakdown. The Administration makes a 
decisive attack on the problem in terms somewhat novel for 
America, economically and administratively. The Court an~ 
swers not by an attack on the problem-insists, in fact, that 
it is quite unconcerned with that-but by an attack on the 
attackers. This course was taken, as is fairly clear now, not 
because of the inherent inelasticity of the Constitution, or 
the inevitability of the particular tradition 6f constitutional 
interpretation that was chosen, but primarily because of the 
inflexibility of the majority's social philosophy. The strug-
gle was joined between effective government and judicial 
supremacy . 
.\.nd yet again, in stating it thus, the truth is likely to 
prove elusive. It would be a mistake to view the Supreme 
Court's role wholly in terms of inertia. While the social 
philosophy of the majority was a quietist one, their judicial 
philosophy was decidedly activist. Their attack on the New 
Deal program of social legislation was vigorous in the ex-
treme. (It is worth nothing, in contrast, that while the eco-
nomic and social philosophy of the current Court majority 
is a dynamic one, its judicial philosophy is quietist-that of 
judicial tolerance of legislative action.) If we premise some 
sort of equilibrium in the attitude of the people, between 
2 For the terms used here I am indebted to B. H. Levy, Our Constitution: 
Tool or Testament? New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 194I. 
their attraction to the idea of necessary legislative change and 
their clinging to the traditions of necessary judicial guardian-
ship of individual rights, we may say that the violence of 
the Court's attack threw it off its keel, so far as the delicate 
balance of public opinion was concerned. The President, 
reinforced in public opinion by his election for a second 
term, sensed this and counter-attacked the Court with his 
proposal for reorganization. But the President too attacked 
more violently than he could afford to. He too was thrown 
off his keel. And he left himself vulnerable to an onslaught 
that, using the Court plan as the immediate target, went far 
beyond that target. The varied forces that had been gen-
erating opposition, for one reason or another, to the social 
philosophy or the political tactic of the Administration were 
polarized around this issue. Especially was this true of many 
of the liberals, who, while supporting the New Deal, had 
unquiet doubts about its seemingly erratic course and the 
crudity of its energies: they now had a chance to release 
those doubts of a general character under the guise of oppo-
sition to a specific break with tradition. And in the course 
of the turmoil, over the President's plan, his opponents-lib-
erals, conservatives, and reactionaries alike-were able to reach 
deep to the basic fears of the people. For what finally de-
feated the President's plan was the sense of fear that we were 
breaking loose from our moorings in the Constitution and 
setting sail for shores unknown. The result is history 
The course that the constitutional crisis ran is now fairly 
clear, and has been given some precision in Mr. Jackson's 
narrative. There were four phases. The first, in 1933 and 
1934, was when the Court "hesitated between two worlds," 
upholding some of the state reform legislation but giving no 
clear indication of what it would do with the national pro-
gram. The second was the "nullification" period in 1935 
and 1936, in which the Court used its axe freely on national 
legislation. The third was the President's reorganization 
plan, the struggle over it, and its legislative defeat. And the 
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fourth was the new line of decisions by the Court, indicat-
ing a changed orientation, and eventually the fonnation of 
a new majority. 
Certain questions arise. Could the crisis have been avoided? 
The answer must be clearly in the affirmative, unless we 
premise on inevitable and determinist relationship between 
capitalist economic crisis and a quietist social philosophy on 
the part of the Court majority which the later history of the 
Court does not bear out. Need the crisis have been as acute 
as it was? This is more difficult of answer. One thing is 
clear: once the Court acted with the extremism it did, and 
once the President's dramatic plan was announced, com-
promise became extremely difficult. Many who had been 
disquieted by the Court's decisions found it necessary now 
to suppress their doubts about the Court in their zeal for the 
defense of judicial independence. And many who were dis-
quieted about the particular plan of the President found it 
necessary to suppress their doubts in their zeal for some sort 
of judicial refonn. Once the battle was joined, the alterna-
tives for both groups became absolute. F or one group it be-
came a question of either complete judicial supremacy or 
judicial subordination. F or the other it oecame a question _ 
of either the President's plan or no judicial refonn at all. In 
the clash of power politics the desirable direction was trans-
formed into an ideological absolute which had either to be 
defeated as a whole or accepted as a whole. Everything 
intermediate was squeezed out. 
I turn now to a crucial question. How was the constitu-
tional crisis resolved? In answering it we must seek a differ-
ent answer from what it would be were our question, How 
was the political struggle over the Court reorganization bill 
resolved, and who was the victor in the legislative battle? 
F or the resolution of a constitutional crisis involves not the 
detennination of victor and vanquished, but the clearing of 
the obstacles that stand in the way of effective government. 
Thus there was a shift in judicial philosophy on the Court 
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from one militantly opposed to the Administration to one 
tolerant of its efforts to resume its attack on the basic eco-
nomic problems. And that change, as Mr. Jackson tells us, 
took place even before the active changes in the personnel 
of the Court through resignation and replacement. The 
change was made partly as a tactical matter, to help persuade 
Congress to vote against the Court bill. 
Yet, it would be wrong to say, as Jackson does, that there-
fore the ultimate change in the Court's attitude was not due 
to a change in personnel. For without the actual changes 
in personnel that followed, the balance of power would have 
remained in the hands of Justice Hughes and Roberts, and the 
victory for the New Deal, represented by the Court's shift 
in orientation, could not have been consolidated. The first 
period of uncertainty and hesitation that opened the consti-
tutional crisis might have been repeated. And it is significant 
that the recent Supreme Court policy indicates that what 
change there has been in the judicial philosophy of Justices 
Hughes and Roberts has not been so essential as to take, them 
out of the category of frequent dissenters from the current 
Court majority on economic cases. 
Thus the crisis was resolved in two stages: first, when the 
threat of Court reorganization resulted temporarily in a shift 
of judicial attitude in the balance-of-power group; and later, 
when the way was cleared for changes in the personnel of 
the Court. As a result of both there was a return to the 
more flexible of the Supreme Court traditions of constitu-
tional interpretation. 
There are several other observations that may be worth 
making, and I am the less disinclined to make them because 
I have not seen adequate emphasis on them in the literature. 
They have to do with the resolution of the crisis. But their 
emphasis is not with the legislative struggle or the court per-
sonnel or the doctrine or philosophy of the judges: rather 
with popular consciousness and class tensions in our society. 
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If the Court bill had been passed and we had in that way 
(through the forced substitution or addition of judges) 
achieved our present Court liberalism, it would have been 
difficult for the country to accept that liberalism with the 
lack of social tension that now characterizes our attitude to-
ward the Court. The Big Industry groups would have felt 
it to be an unparalleled exercise of arbitrary power. Even 
the large majority mass would have found it difficult to 
accept the results, however these results might have com-
ported with the effective government they wanted. For 
even the majority fears to get the right things in the wrong 
way. And enough of it had by that time become convinced 
that the Court plan was the wrong way. 
As it happened, the Big Industry groups were stopped from 
the sort of vociferous and active resistance which they would 
have offered to the decisions of the new Court if, in their 
minds, judicial independence had been destroyed through the 
"packing" of the Court. So, in a deep sense, it was well that 
while the Administration got the brunt of popular attention 
in 1933-1935, and the Court's decisions got it in 1935, it 
was what happened between Congress and the President that 
got the brunt of attention in the 1938 days. The (at least 
outward) victory of Congress deflected attention from the 
actual resolution of the constitutional crisis through the play 
of power politics upon doctrine. The popular mind, which 
had been stirred to the depths by the events of the Court 
fight, and in which allegiance to effective government had 
been aligned against allegiance to judicial independence, was 
now allowed to go back to its traditional channels. The peo-
ple could have their cake and eat it too. As for Big Industry, 
it could not eat its cake, but it also could scarcely protest: 
for it was its cake, was it not? It had won the fight against 
the Court plan. Even Mr. Willkie, in the campaign for his 
nomination, was not able, through his well known Saturday 
Evening Post article on the new Court orientation, to stir up 
resentment against a too-liberal Court that had after all not 
been "packed." 
Thus what might have meant a more or less serious impair-
ment of the prestige of the Constitution and Court has been 
averted. And this has happened largely because the setde-
ment was accomplished within the constitution rather than 
outside it. What a theme here for a Thurman Arnold on 
the way in which everything turns on the decorous observ-
ance of symbols-were not Mr. Arnold himself far too busily 
engaged these days in the decorous observance of symbols 
to write about them. 
But perhaps because of the very fact of the observance of 
symbols, the central problem of judicial supremacy has been 
left unaffected. F or if and when we again get a court which 
believes that social policy must be shaped by a process of liti-
gation we shall run into another major judicial constitutional 
cnSIS. 
I have spoken thus far of an episode in recent American 
history which presented an example of an interlocked con-
stitutional crisis, which was in its first great phase economic 
and its second judicial. It is moreover an instance of a com-
pleted crisis cycle-one that has run its course, although it 
has left a residue of effects. 
I turn now to a different type of crisis-what I have termed 
the war constitutional crisis. The democratic crisis state, 
after weathering pretty well its first (domestic) storm, is now 
facing its second (international) storm. It was inevitable, 
as we entered into the phase of severe international strain, 
that constitutional difficulties should arise. The need for 
extraordinary pace and decisiveness in action necessarily 
placed strains on the constitutional limits of the state. But 
it was also to be expected that those strains would apply not 
to the relations between the Administration and the Court, 
but between the Presidency and Congress, and that they 
would be fought out not in Court decisions but in Congres-
sional debates and the channels of opinion formation. 
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That is happening now. I do not consider that we are at 
present in a state of serious constitutional crisis. I do think 
that we are in a state of constitutional expansion which has 
crisis elements and potentials. I shall speak later of the broad-
ening by the present Court of the limits of tolerance for so-
cial legislation both of the federal government and the states. 
Yet while some of our constitutional troops are thus em-
ployed in consolidating their victory, the real spearhead of 
constitutional expansion must be sought elsewhere-in the 
Presidency in wartime. 
You will undoubtedly have noted the important new Presi-
dency books that have been 'published this year by Laski, 
Corwin, Herring.3 This concentration on the Presidency 
represents a sound instinct, born of a dual outlook: first, a 
sense of the need for great leadership in America's hour of 
decision; and second, a sense of the difficulties that will be 
(and have already been) encountered in the reaching out 
for Presidential effectiveness. 
I shall not present an analysis of the constitutional aspects 
of the Presidency. That has already been done with con-
siderable sharpness and in great detail by Corwin. Again I 
want only to set down some reflections on aspects of our 
constitutional system in wartime. 
One of the difficult but exciting things about the demo-
cratic crisis state is that it must carryon under democratic 
forms in a world that is abandoning them. And this paradox 
becomes particularly acute in wartime. Although I shall not 
discuss our foreign policy from the angle of its merits, it is 
important to note that we are today committed to full aid 
to the anti-Nazi nations. What does that mean in govern-
mental terms? It means we must fulfill the conditions of 
modern warfare to survive, just as in the domestic crisis we 
3 Harold J. Laski, The American Presidency, New York, Harper, 1940; 
E. S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, New York University 
Press, 1940; E. P. Herring, Presidential Leadership, New York, Farrar & 
Rinehart, 1940. 
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had to fulfill the conditions of modern economic and ad-
ministrative strategy to survive. War today is of a dual na-
ture: it is a war of factories and a war of morale. To or-
ganize our armament power to aid Britain requires the dele-
gation of vast powers to the Presidency. To mobilize our 
factory power will raise further questions of war-industries 
control. To deal with morale will raise problems of civil 
liberties. But the exacting thing about our situation is that 
everything we do in our defense effort is geared to the pace 
and scope of the efforts of the fascist powers. In effect-
and here is the paradox-although not yet at. war, we are 
having to operate as if we were fighting a war. Yet, since 
we have not declared it, our officials do not have either the · 
legal or the psychological powers they would otherwise 
have. 
The problem here, as in the crisis of 1935-1938, is again 
one of the dominant need of governmental effectiveness if we 
are to survive, as against an inflexibility of governmental doc-
trine and machinery. But the differences are important. 
The struggle is not primarily in the economic but in the po-
litical realm. The difficulties do not center in the Supreme 
Court but in the relation of the President to Congress and 
sections of public opinion. The ideological minus-symbols 
that are in use are not those of (economic) socialism but 
of (political) dictatorship; and the opposite plus-symbols are 
not judicial authority but civil liberties and political survival. 
The institution of the American Presidency is confronting 
the severest test of its whole history. For no matter what 
happens in world affairs, the path ahead of us is likely for 
some time to be as difficult and stumbling as any we have 
taken. And the Presidency will have to bear the brunt of 
the burden. For while Congress will have its path cut out to 
subject the acts of the President and the administrative and 
military arms of the government to the pitiless test of discus-
sion, and the Court will have to draw a perilous line between 
public need and private wrong, the great shaping and forma-
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tive work must be the President's. That has always been 
true in times of crisis in America, but it will be particularly 
true in a war crisis of the world era of totalitarianism. 
Have we a conception of the Presidency adequate to this 
need? Here too, as in the case of the scope of the judicial 
power, there are several alternative traditions we can draw 
upon. One starts with Jefferson but has generally been asso-
ciated with the weaker Presidents and the laissez faire execu-
tive doctrines: that the President dots the i's and crosses the 
t's for Congress, and acts as a sort of tabula rasa on which 
"the laws of economics" are written. The other starts with 
Jackson and Lincoln and includes Cleveland, Theodore 
Roosevelt, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt. I should like 
to submit that a conception of Presidential leadership ade-
quate to our needs would have to be based on a conception 
of a militant and affirmative democracy. It would draw 
upon the second list of names and examples I have mentioned, 
but it would set them in the international context of today. 
What is that international context? It may seem a far 
cry from a discussion of world forces to the American Con-
stitution: but the latter will not be either workable or in-
telligible from now on except in that context. It is a con-
text of changing technologies of diplomacy and war. It is 
a context in which national isolation or neutrality are no 
longer possible. It is a context of the breakup of the inter-
national order we have known. It is a context in which 
only the strong and affirmative state can survive. 
In the light of this the Presidency in the democratic crisis 
state is likely to extend its power in four areas-first, the 
military forces, over which the President is already com-
mander-in-chief. Second, the organization of the war in-
dustrial structure. Third, the further extension and co-or-
dination of the administrative agencies. Fourth, the shaping 
of foreign policy. 
Of these, the President's control of the military forces is 
the least likely to be called in question. Yet this is exactly 
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the point where Lincoln exceeded his powers by taking upon 
himself in the early stages, without Congress, the responsi-
bility of getting the country ready to fight a civil war. That 
contingency is not likely to arise again unless a Nazi vic- ' 
tory over England should align against each other the groups 
that want to bring our institutions into the orbit of Hitler 
and the groups that would fight such an eventuality to the 
bitter end. And yet the President, because of the anomaly 
of our being at war yet not at war, is today having friction 
with Congress in regard to the disposition of the armed forces. 
The difference is that what the President as Commander-in-
chief could have done under a state of war now has to be 
done more laboriously as part of the shaping of foreign policy. 
Yet even here recent events have shown the President has 
broad enough range in negotiations to commit the nation step 
by step to a definite foreign policy. 
In two of the other three areas there is · likely to be a 
good deal less friction before a declaration of war and more 
after it. In the area of industrial organization, while the 
crucial problems will not immediately be constitutional, we 
have learned that questions of property have a way of con-
verting themselves into questions of constitutional power. 
In the area of administrative control enough has been done 
in an experimental way during the New Deal (for example, 
the recent Acheson report) to attenuate the potential diffi-
culties during the war years. Bl).t it is in the area of the shap-
ing of foreign policy, that the great difficulties have already 
cropped up and will continue to do so. 
There are already many who fear this expansion of power 
as dictatorship, and others who welcome it as a departure 
from the cumbersomeness of a leaderless democracy. But 
surely we need not accept either position. Our task is neither 
~o whittle away the necessary power nor to submit blindly 
to arbitrary power. Rather is it to give the President the 
powers he needs, but encircle them with institutional safe-
guards, and build into them, in the fashioning and executi.on 
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of policy, those who represent various groups with a real 
stake in the fight against totalitarianism. 
This will still leave knotty problems-of civil liberties, of 
labor's claim, of the competition of political ideas and po-
litical policies. Once more the Supreme Court will have 
to wrestle with the "clear and present danger" doctrine, in 
its application to untried situations. 
I say, there will be knotty problems, for several basic rea-
sons. For first, a war or defense emergency brings closer to 
each other the political and economic structures of a nation. 
The imperatives of production become political imperatives. 
The scope of labor choice and bargaining and organization 
become questions fraught with immense political importance. 
At what point labor is being asked, like any other group, 
to serve the nation's interest and at what point it is being 
victimized, under the guise of the national interest, by dollar-
a-year men in the government and by army-men who some-
times have no sympathy for labor-those too may be tough 
and intricate questions. The safest general course is again 
to apply the rule of participation-to ask whether labor has 
had a hand in administering the machinery to which it is 
being subjected. Second, a war or defense emergency whit-
tles away the line between utterance and action, between 
private right and public responsibility, between conscience 
and constraint. And third, a war or defense emergency 
brings various local communities together in common and 
more or less standardized sentiments; and while it infects 
them with a central tension, it has rarely the machinery for 
keeping their potential vigilantism in check. It is in these 
local areas, I think, rather than in the action of the national 
government, that most of the civil liberties cases will arise. 
And here too the only possible defense against them is the 
persistent att.empt to spread a sense of the rule of law and' 
the fabric of equality. 
I have said above that these will be knotty problems for the 
Supreme Court to solve. I have relatively few fears about 
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the quality of their solution. It is not only that I consider 
our present Court a great and technically proficient one. It 
is also that through all the crises of the past decade-economic, 
political, constitutional, international-our democracy has re-
tained the essential fabric of legality, the patient education 
of opinion by the government and the responsiveness of the 
government to opinion. 
This deserves a word. F or we have allowed our thinking 
about democracy and dictatorship to become thin, smug, and 
superficial. We ' judge them in quantitative terms, as if we 
were grocers weighing our potatoes. Dictatorship means 
great power, we say; democracy, little power. Dictatorship 
means concentrated power, democracy, safely dispersed and 
divided power. But to say and think that is to fall victim to 
the great tragic fallacy of our age. F or it is not true that 
to survive a democracy must be weak. In any forin of gov-
ernment, power must be adequate to the tasks placed on it. 
And in any form of government, power must be concen-
trated as far as may be necessary for survivaL 
The crux of the problem must be sought in legal, political, 
and economic responsiveness. The Nazi war-lords must by 
their very nature be lawless, because if they once admitted 
a system of law to which their power would be subject, by 
which it would be measured and its arbitrariness checked, 
their whole house of cards might fall. The only law they 
recognze is the law they declare, just as the only interna-
tional order they recognize is the order they can enclose 
within their iron ring of coercion and terror. And what 
goes .for legal responsiveness goes also for political and eco-
nomic. So long as we can keep our leaders in office or turn 
them out at will, so long as jobs are not dependent on state 
or party, so long as we can keep open the channels for the 
competition of ideas, the democratic crisis state can be at 
once decisive and constitutional, strong without sacrificing 
the liberties of its people. 
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